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Abstract 
This article explores pleasure in terms of the values of independent judgement, writerly 
authority, originality and singularity associated with doctoral study.  It also considers how 
pleasure can be understood as a mode of experience that acts as a force for change.  Here, 
the article takes a broad Deleuzian approach that is concerned with our capacities to affect 
and be affected.   The data presented illustrates the complexity of pleasure in academic 
work as it is experienced, as giving rise to guilt, anxiety and a felt lack of deservingness.  It 
also illustrates moments of intellectual jouissance and the importance of imagined pleasures 
as a very necessary force of change.   In the conclusion, I return to the conceptualization of 
pleasure at the heart of this article to provide a critical account of the potential of 
understanding pleasure in terms of change and values.  
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Introduction 
This article explores pleasure in terms of values in the doctoral process.  It also considers 
how pleasure can be understood as a mode of experience that acts as a force for change.  
The article seeks to achieve these aims through an analysis of the processes of learning to 
become an academic.  The pedagogical stage that is the specific focus of this article is the 
period of apprenticeship of undertaking a doctorate.  It perhaps goes without saying that 
much formative learning takes place during this time and, as many accounts testify, this 
period of an academic career can be experienced in strongly negative ways in terms of 
loneliness, isolation and anxiety about direction and completion.  It is certainly the case that 
the data presented here reflects much in the way of these kinds of experience.  However, 
pleasure, as with emotions which are more generally held to be positive, tends to be 
neglected in critical accounts of the doctoral process.  This is because, in many frames of 
analysis, pleasure is strongly theorized as linked to stasis or equilibrium, and as a 
consequence conceived as returning the subject to a balanced state or leaving the subject 
unchanged.  
 
In contrast, pedagogical aims, even at the level of an everyday pedagogy (Luke and Gore, 
1992), are overwhelmingly concerned with development and progress.  Here, desire or 
motivation is taken as the concept of choice because it is so strongly viewed as a force for 
transformation. Where pleasure is included in these accounts, there is a tendency to place it 
in a subordinate position.  Thus, it becomes an adjunct to change rather than being a force 
for change in itself.  Through the terminology of plaisir and jouissance, Barthes (1975) draws 
attention to this by distinguishing between different kinds of pleasure and their role in 
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change.  Plaisir is the easy going enjoyment that one experiences when encountering texts 
that confirm, and hence leave unchanged, one’s own perspectives.  Jouissance is the more 
intense pleasure-bliss that occurs when the text opens up hitherto unknown vistas, and as a 
consequence leaves the subject altered.   
 
The data presented in this article is part of a broader study of pleasure I have been 
undertaking that has included questionnaire and interview data (for a fuller account see: 
Hughes, 2007: Hughes, Perrier and Kramer, 2009).  In this article I specifically focus on the 
case of Sian, a doctoral student in her third year of full-time study.  Sian is of working-class 
origin and someone who, by dint of education and working experience, has already 
experienced significant class travel (see Hughes, 2004; Baxter and Hughes, 2004).  This 
means that, although Sian still connects strongly with her working-class roots, her first 
degree and paid working experiences of political lobbying have produced multifaceted class 
identifications.  Lucey, Melody and Walkerdine (2003) describe this complexity in terms of 
hybridity and they note how moving into intellectual domains represents an enormous shift 
for those working-class young women who do well at school. In selecting one case, I make 
no claims for representativeness.  Rather, I draw on Sian’s account because it exemplifies 
how pleasure is a force in the processes of identificatory change that comprise this 
enormous shift.   
 
This article begins with a review of desire and pleasure in pedagogical accounts.  I explore 
the alternative preferences of Deleuze and Foucault in terms of their use of these terms.  
This is because, despite their different positions, they highlight how change and stasis are so 
associated with notions of desire and pleasure respectively.  In considering pleasure as a 
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force that contributes to changing class identifications, I argue that this is a machinic rather 
than a linear or an absolute process. Accordingly, we need to understand change in terms of 
a multiplicity of forces in motion rather than as a fixed movement from one condition to 
another.  In this way, Sian is conceived in this article as an assemblage ‘where power 
relations and forces of [pleasure] are constantly at play in creating conditions of possibility 
for women to resist, imagine themselves becoming other and for new possibilities in their 
lives to be actualized’ (Tamboukou, 2009: 4).   
 
Deleuze’s concept of line of flight to explore the ‘connection between a has-been and the 
becoming’ (Maccormack, 2008) is helpful here.  Within lines of flight, the stabilizing forces of 
territorialization maintain internal homogeneity, whilst forces of deterritorialization have 
destabilizing effects.  Tamboukou (2009) notes that both processes can be at work at the 
same time, and this points to a certain fragility in the unpicking, undoing and remaking that 
is change.  Deleuze and Guattari (2004) also offer us the concept of reterritorialization.   This 
is where lines of flight are overcoded by a new power.   Suggesting something of resistance, 
Renold and Ringrose (2008: 319) note, however, that ‘”Lines of flight” are not so quickly 
reterritorialized’.   
 
These analytic concepts are drawn upon to explore Sian’s account of her relationship with 
pleasure in terms of identifying the values that are, more commonly, reified in the passion 
for despair that dominates our understanding of being a doctoral student.  In saying this, it 
may be surprising that the first part of the data presented in this article begins with strong 
accounts of despondency and anguish.  However, the key point here is to note how Sian 
seeks a line of flight away from such negativity, as she strives to overcome her classed sense 
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of a lack of entitlement to being in the academy. It is perhaps salutary that she appears to 
fail to do this and, in consequence, this tells us much about the embeddedness of 
territorialized subjectivities.   
 
I then explore some heady pleasures that arise from being engaged in academic work.  In 
the data presented, these pleasures are realized through moments of jouissance where 
there is considerable pleasure in the practice of intellectual skills and insights.  What is 
significant is that this occurs outside the academy during what may appear simply as leisure 
time. Nonetheless, it is important to note that it is when watching reality television 
programmes, rather than in supervisions or presentations, that Sian is able to bring 
together, most fully, aspects of the self she was and the academic self she seeks to become.   
What we see here is how processes of overcoding come to have meaning, but do not shift 
but rather meet with resistance embedded through earlier pleasures.  
 
In a switch from present to future, I then explore pleasure as a necessary resource for 
change that draws its strength from an imaginary of post-doctoral life.  I link this imaginary 
to the criterion of originality in the PhD.  I am not concerned with originality in terms of 
thesis findings.  Rather, I explore how the requirement of originality is a form of recognition 
of the subject as an intellectual. Whilst Sian views this in terms of a destination at the end of 
a line of flight away from particular kinds of classed diminution experienced in the academy, 
in the conclusion I draw a caution to this kind of interpretation.  Here, I return to the 
conceptualization of change and pleasure at the heart of the article to provide a critical 
account of the potential of understanding pleasure in this way.  
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Pleasure, Desire, Desire, Pleasure: Foucault and Deleuze 
 
In pedagogical discussions, pleasure appears to be the poor relation of desire (however, see 
Clayton et al, 2009; Quinn, 2008; Swan, 2005; McWilliam, 1999).  With desire’s emphasis on 
lack or need, this may be because desire is strongly aligned to ideas of motivation.  A focus 
on desire directs the teacher to be concerned with meeting the needs and wants of the 
learner (Watkins, 2008). Indeed, the preference for focusing on desire over pleasure is 
predicated on this potentiality for change.  In consequence, teachers are taught that 
understanding student desire/motivation is essential to good pedagogical approaches.  
This is not to say, of course, that pleasure is never considered as part of the panoply of 
affects that are necessary to motivation.  However, the division between liking (ie the affect 
of pleasure) and wanting (ie motivational desire) is strongly encoded in our approaches to 
these concepts.  This means that when pleasure is discussed it is predominantly understood 
as an emotional moment that occurs when desire is met.  It is an after effect, a 
consequence, or indeed a prize of change rather than a force of change itself.   
For example, Watkins (2008: 115) notes how pleasure follows the fulfillment of desire when 
a student achieves a learning objective, as there is ‘the resultant pleasure that ensues for 
both teacher and student’.  Student displeasure, the seeming converse of pleasure, is also 
understood in terms of change, although this is in respect of the failure of the teacher to 
effect change or, perhaps, student resistance to change.  Displeasure in terms of student 
critique, poor evaluation of courses and struggling to understand is not understood as 
something to be embraced, but to be avoided.  Each manifestation suggests some kind of 
pedagogical breakdown. 
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In terms of broader theory, pleasure is also associated with stasis and equilibrium.  For 
example, in Freud’s discussion of the pleasure/pain principle, pleasure is conceived in terms 
of a balanced psychological state. Thus, Freud conceptualizes pleasure as a state of 
oscillation rather than transformation (MacCormack, 2008).  Foucault’s (1985) account of 
bio-power and the development of the ethical subject also indicates how pleasure can be 
construed in the quantitative terms of balance (Hughes, 2007).  Foucault demonstrates how 
the pursuit of an admirable life was founded in the balance between self-discipline and 
regulation and permissive or excessive conduct.  Too much, one way or the other is 
problematic.  
Foucault’s take up of the term pleasure is not evident in the work of Deleuze who draws on 
desire as the preferred concept.  Indeed, Foucault and Deleuze were each seemingly 
implacably opposed to the use of the other term as this anecdote by Deleuze makes clear: 
The last time we saw each other, Michel told me, with much kindness and affection, 
something like, I cannot bear the word desire; even if you use it differently, I cannot 
keep myself from thinking or living that desire = lack, or that desire is repressed,  
Michel added, whereas myself, what I call pleasure is perhaps what you call desire; 
but in any case I need another word than desire. Obviously …this is more than a 
question of words.  Because for my part I can scarcely tolerate the word pleasure. 
(Deleuze, 1997: 189)   
Foucault’s preference for ‘pleasure’ was because of a concern about the psychoanalytic 
understandings of ‘desire’ that always suggested lack, and because it foregrounded a 
meaning of power in negative, repressive rather than productive terms.  Indeed, Foucault 
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illustrates how pleasure can be a form of resistance through which change occurs.   For 
example, McWhorter (1999: 176) comments that for Foucault pleasure is ‘not just a state of 
the body and/or mind that occurs following some particular accomplishment or stimulus.  
Pleasure is not just an outcome.  Pleasure, like power, is creative’. Grosz (2005: 191) also 
notes that ‘if pleasure can function in the service of power, as a means and end of power’s 
operations, so too pleasure is that wedge which serves and consolidates resistance’ (see 
also Sawicki, 2004). 
In contrast, Deleuze rejects the term ‘pleasure’ because he views it as something that 
interrupts desire.  Yet, as the quotation indicates, Foucault’s and Deleuze’s concerns about 
terminology draw upon particular histories and genealogies.  MacCormack (2008) indicates 
that Foucault’s disdain of the term ‘desire’ lies in its particular Lacanian and psychoanalytic 
meanings which do present lack as the primary motivator of desire.  In contrast, Grosz 
(2005: 192) notes ’Deleuze argues that because desire (in his works) is not a psychological 
concept at all, and because desire cannot be represented by the (Hegelian/psychoanalytic) 
model of lack – for desire is always and only productive – desire produces and makes the 
real by establishing connections or generating disjunctions; it is pleasure that must be 
understood to interrupt and transform desire’ (see also Zembylas, 2007).  Desire, for 
Deleuze, is ‘process as opposed to structure or genesis; it is affect as opposed to sentiment; 
it is “haecc-iety” (the individuality of a day, a season, a life) as opposed to subjectivity’ 
(Deleuze, 1997: 189).  Yet, MacCormack (2008) notes how Deleuze’s concept of pleasure 
draws on the idea of mandatory satisfaction, which accrues to more traditional meanings 
where pleasure is directed for or toward rather than against something.   
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Drawing upon these features, MacCormack (2008) challenges Deleuze’s view of pleasure as 
a reterritorializing threat and argues, in contrast, that it is deterritorializing. She argues that 
pleasure can be a force of destabilization as she notes ‘like Deleuze’s incarnation of desire, 
[pleasure] exceeds linguistics, it has no particular beginning or end, and it continually 
transforms the subject’.   Such processes may be quite profound, as in the case of moments 
of jouissance.   They may be more imperceptible in terms of ‘the small and often passed 
over spaces where regulation and resistance might meet’ (Renold and Ringrose, 2008: 320).   
 
Deleuze views the subject as in constant flux and, through his debt to Spinoza’s thought, ‘in 
constant interchange with its environment’ (Gatens, 2000: 60; see also Deleuze and 
Deleuze, 1978).  Of relevance to this article is the view that ‘Bodies of all sorts are in 
constant relation with other bodies.  Some of these relations are compatible and give rise to 
joyful affects that may in turn increase the intensive capacity of a body; others are 
incompatible relations that give rise to sad or debilitating affects, which at their worst may 
entirely destroy a body’s integrity’ (Gatens, 2000: 65).  As this article demonstrates, the 
power to affect is not solely vested in human encounters but is also invested in the text that 
awaits writing. I turn to this issue now.  
 
The Undeservingness of Pleasure  
One of the notable aspects of researching pleasure in learning is that there appears to be 
very little talk about it (see however developments from the work of Deci and Ryan, 1985). 
This is not only the case in the broad literature on teaching, learning and pedagogies.  It is 
also the case in respect of how often pleasure is referred to in interviews compared with 
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how often various displeasures are referred to.  For example, in responding to one of the 
questions in a questionnaire sent to doctoral students for this study, Sian wrote:  
Q: In a continuum of pain-pleasure, how would you describe your reading and writing 
experiences? 
R:  Pain, pain, pain, pleasure, pain. 
Whilst the pain of study is not confined to one particular aspect of the PhD, as Sian’s 
questionnaire indicated, writing is a specific area of concern:   
I HATE WRITING!! I don’t hate writing.  I hate getting started. This is a tortuous 
process which confounds me. I think that if I could just get over my inability to get 
started I would be an amazing academic with loads to offer but I waste time. I get 
crazy stressed just the same as when I have to read something. I think “why am I 
putting myself through this?” 
There is no doubt that writing 80,000 words of succinct, theoretically critical, grammatically 
correct and thoughtful prose is a daunting prospect and writing, generally, is an area where 
research students (and many others!) experience the most struggle.  In the social sciences it 
is also, by and large, a solitary activity and so accords with the dominant idea of isolation 
associated with undertaking doctoral research (Delamont, Atkinson and Parry, 2000).  In 
addition, the requirement to be an authority renders its own insecurities.  Indeed, the depth 
of feeling provoked by the need to write, and the power of the demand to be a writer, 
illustrates how the body of the waiting-to-be-written text exercises its power to provoke 
sadness. Taguchi (2007) uses the term embodied violence to refer to the intense feelings of 
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frustration and provocation, and the displeasures that students experience as they struggle 
to understand certain issues and perspectives.  This is because students often feel that they 
are being beaten, and even beaten up, by the subject matter, and indeed the very texts, 
with which they engage: 
 
Such uncertainty was even felt in terms of embodied violence, as if being shoved 
around in the text, hitting what seemed to be the ‘wrong’ ways of understanding, 
even causing ‘broken bones’.  (Taguchi, 2007: 8) 
 
In a powerful mirroring of the textual and biological body, Sian illustrates how such 
experiences produce negative body images that reinforce writing as the Other who proves 
one’s unworthiness for academic work:    
I know all the techniques for getting started and I still go through this process every 
time I have to write something of significance. HOW WILL I EVER WRITE MY THESIS 
[her emphasis].  It is also hell for everyone around me, I become moody, tearful, 
snappy, I feel fat, ugly, bloated and totally useless, I look for any other reason other 
than the fact that I just need to get going to understand and legitimate and relieve 
my mood. Nothing but getting started works… it’s miserable. 
However, these experiences do not negate the expectation that the horror of writing might 
be overcome at some point and that, in consequence, the relationship between text and self 
that produces negative and delimiting affects will alter. During an interview, Sian further 
commented: 
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I never get in love with it [writing PhD]…. I’ll be gutted if I don’t fall in love with my 
work at some stage.  
Certainly there is something of the value in being an engaged intellectual who brings 
passion and endeavour to her research in Sian’s remarks about hoping to love her research.  
Sian’s remarks also point to the value of pleasure itself.  Such moments of pleasure are not 
ones of narcissism, but certainly occur when one experiences technical and aesthetic 
competence. And yet it is more than this.  It is pleasure in change when the text most 
completely represents the complexities, nuances and thoughtfulness of an imminent 
intellect:  
 It mostly happens when I write. It feels like a creeping realization of Oh My God… 
this is a good one, brilliant, gosh aren’t I clever. Though it’s not that.  It’s actually 
changing. It’s more like I have hit the nail on the head or I am actually using words 
that accurately reflect what I am thinking and feeling about something.  It’s very 
hard to describe it to you. 
Nonetheless, such moments appear to be insufficient to prevent a return to the subject 
position of incapable writer.  Sian describes a more common experience of the ‘fog cloud’ 
that unravels any hard won sense of the possibilities of becoming an academic:  
 
Before the dissertation [MA dissertation prior to PhD study], where I could think wow 
I could be an academic, I had the audacity to dare that I could be like them. God I 
could be someone like.  And then I slam it down especially when the fog comes back 
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and I see I have written one paragraph and I think how dare you have the audacity to 
think like that, and I slam it down and probably I’ll have another bad writing day.  
 
When asked why the positive emotions associated with pleasure are so elusive in studying 
for her PhD, Sian responded in terms that it was an unsafe feeling as it presaged a downfall. 
As her comments indicate, to believe she could have the pleasure she associates with having 
a PhD, and the career that may go with it, is impudent, an effrontery to (more respected 
and entitled) others and even reckless daring.  These feelings are not ascribed to direct put 
downs, though we know from the work of others how pervasive are the derisory discourses 
of class and gender (Lawler, 1999).   When pleasure happens or there is a possibility of 
gratification in outcome, Sian responds by telling herself:  
 
…shame on you for believing it could happen, shame on you to have the audacity to 
think you could do this; stupid you for thinking that was going to work out, shame on 
you to have the audacity to think this could happen for you.   Silly you for having a 
smile on your face.  I don’t fantasise very much about what I could be academically. 
Because the disappointment is so enormous …  Could I be an academic in America? 
Could I could I write even an article? Could I write my PhD?   Squash it squash 
it…SQUASH IT. 
 
There is more to this feeling of the tortures of writing than simply a skill deficit in terms of 
an inability to put words on article.  In one respect, we can view Sian’s responses as 
evidencing a deeply held sense of a lack of entitlement, which is a consequence of the 
exercise of class and gender-based power in the academy.  Here, Rose’s (2001: 20) history of 
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the intellectual life of the British working-classes is relevant, as he demonstrates how 
‘Educated people commonly (though by no means universally) found something profoundly 
menacing in the efforts of working people to educate themselves and write for themselves’. 
Similarly, Ahmed (2008) illustrates how ‘certain bodies [are] seen as the origin of bad 
feeling, as getting in the way of public happiness’.    Experiencing being the ‘wrong body’ 
produces a range of affects, some perhaps subtle and fleeting, such as simply feeling 
somehow that you don’t fit in towards more intense senses of being the object of revulsion. 
Such is the strength of this sense of lack of entitlement that, even when Sian experiences 
some success in getting published, the pleasure associated with this achievement is 
downgraded by drawing on the myriad of ways that it was never really all her own work.  
And so, when asked how she felt when her work was published she said: 
 
 It felt terrible … Well as always I can’t lay claim to it as all my own work because 
[supervisor] was really helpful in the editing process and as my mum said trying to be 
nice “You’re lucky she didn’t ask to be first or second author” … I’ve always been 
incredibly lucky because [another academic] was incredibly generous … but the help 
I’ve always had takes away, doesn’t feel legitimate… the help I’ve had takes away the 
authorship.  
 
Yet, Sian should not be understood solely in terms of negative self-evaluation and as falling 
into the abyss of a lack of entitlement.  Indeed, she reflects, correctly, that “The self esteem 
you shouldn’t be here – you know that isn’t true.  If it were totally overriding I would have 
given up wouldn’t I?”  In this case, Sian resists giving in (or giving up) to the negative feelings 
that writing produces.  Perhaps for necessary reinforcement of the more positive messages 
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that publishing accords to one’s work, Sian sends her article, as a literal flight line, to an 
academic whom she admires very much.  She receives a very positive response and yet 
keeps this to herself (though shared with her partner), perhaps because she did have the 
audacity to approach a senior member of the academy and perhaps because to show such 
pride would result in another kind of fall:   
 
 I couldn’t believe I’d put myself out there to be judged.  I felt so exposed. I knew that 
was crap and shouldn’t listen to it.  So I sent it [the published article] to [admired 
academic]… she said … I love it love it love it.  It certainly contributes and great for 
our teaching.  I don’t think I sent it [the email response from respected academic] to 
anyone … I whispered it to [partner]. Did you print that email?  No but I’ve kept it.  I 
was so embarrassed I didn’t even thank her for her kind words. 
 
Jouissance: The Orgasmic Pleasure of Being Intellectual 
Barthes’ concept of jouissance points to pleasure as orgasmic bliss.  It is something that 
cannot be prepared for and so cannot be readily converted to the arsenal of formulaic 
pedagogical interventions that are the realm of much quality assurance. As Aristarkhova 
(2007) comments, ‘To assume that all our pleasures are pre-constructed is to miss the point 
of “productive power” and that resistance “comes first”’.  Rather, jouissance occurs 
spontaneously and without warning.  It is a moment of physical engulfment ‘when my body 
pursues its own ideas – for my body does not have the same ideas I do’ (Barthes, 1975: 17).  
In contrast to plaisir, which Barthes describes as easy going enjoyment of texts that confirm 
rather than challenge one’s own views or experiences, jouissance produces a sense of 
bliss/joy when texts becoming openings for hitherto unrealised vistas and creativities.  
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Jouissance is a significant moment of change in an intellectual trajectory, as it is so strongly 
linked to moments of epiphany (Lambert and Parker, 2006; Phipps et al, 2005).   Jouissance 
is, therefore, relatively rare when considered against the backdrop of the thousands of 
hours of study students and academics engage in, and yet it is a vital moment of proof that 
becoming an academic is possible.  Jouissance has the capacity for transgressive potential, 
and the intensity of such experiences may well contribute to why we remain bound to the 
perverse pleasures (Hey, 2004) of academic work. Perhaps it does have a drug-like 
dopamine effect, in that having tasted its heady pleasures we continue to seek moments of 
jouissance:  
 
99% of the time you don’t get the pleasure but when you do you think, I could do this 
forever, why isn’t it like this all the time, it is so good, really like a childish cycle of 
rediscovery and joy.  
During the interview, Sian was asked if there was any kind of pleasure or any place that she 
experienced pleasure without guilt, or without feeling she does not deserve pleasurable 
experiences.  It is noteworthy that the only type of enjoyment that she could name was 
watching reality television.  Yet this form of cultural production is notoriously understood to 
be low class and therefore sits at odds with a trajectory of escape from a sense of 
diminishment she experiences in academic study.  In their audience research on reality 
television viewing, Skeggs, Thumim and Wood (2008) note how middle-class participants 
expected the researchers to share their views about television generally being ‘a bad object’ 
(p 9) and reality television specifically as an object of derision.  They note that ‘No other 
group felt they had to display such a critical stance or self-justification for their television 
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viewing … [T]hey needed to show not only cultural detachment, but also cultural superiority 
to the bad object’ (p 11).   Skeggs, Thumim and Wood note that this is not to say that such 
participants did not watch, or express pleasure in watching, either television or reality 
television.  They did.  But their interviews demonstrated forms of distancing, through for 
example irony and critique of such cultural forms, in ways that enabled them to hold on to 
their value positions.   
 
Such detachment was not evident in working-class respondents, whose viewing evidenced 
how emotions were brought to the fore and how they got ‘carried away’ when watching.  
They ‘gasped, laughed, tutted, sighed, ‘ooh’ed and/or ‘aah’ed’ (p 17).  This form of engaged 
viewing produced alternative expressions of moral authority as they made judgements that 
were more closely bound with their own lives.  In contrast, middle-class viewers ‘were less 
closely involved with some of the details occurring in the lives of “reality” television 
participants, showing less empathy with the protagonists and being less likely to 
immanently locate themselves within the drama’ (p15).   
 
Sian provides a description of her viewing style as distinctly engaged and emotional.  She 
also indicates how it produces exceptional pleasure:  
 
If I’m on a good day the pleasure is … on the whole is really good fun, tv watching … I 
love telly …I watch loads of telly  I get loads of pleasure from that, and I don’t feel 
guilty it and my argument with [partner] mostly centre on his rubbishing or people in 
general rubbishing my tv watching and I say bugger off  I do love it but it means I 
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stay up late and feel tired … I enjoy deconstructing it.  I’m not a passive watcher. I 
love it.  They [friends] see my responses to it as evidence that I’m not enjoying it [get 
cross and involved]   ... do you not think I’m enjoying it?    
 
Pleasure can of course be deemed a more base emotion than that of pure reason 
(MacCormack, 2008) and this highlights the classed schism between appropriate and 
inappropriate cultural pleasures, as Sian’s partner and friends ‘rubbish’ her taste. Sian is not 
performing according to appropriate middle-class convention either by what she watches or 
how.  Nonetheless, Sian’s account of her enjoyment of reality television is not quite in the 
way of the working-class participants described by Skeggs, Thumim and Wood, who directly 
relate the programme content to their own lives.  In this sense, it is the easy going 
enjoyment of plaisir (Barthes, 1975) that such viewers experience as they identify with and 
submit to the programme’s ‘socially accepted (dominant) meanings’ (Ott, 2004: 196).    
Plaisir is, as Ott notes, ‘a conservative pleasure not because it always (re)produces a 
conservative ideology, but because it is comfortable and comforting’ (p 198).   
 
By contrast, Sian’s engagement is closer to a middle-classed reflexive awareness of this 
cultural form, as her television watching is performed as a critique through which skills and 
knowledge acquired in academic study can be practiced and enjoyed. She notes how she 
can get angry whilst watching such programmes, and how they produce a deep sense of 
involvement.  She also says she has no guilt in watching television.  This is because her 
distance from working-class lifestyles and life chances enables her to bring gendered and 
classed anger and analysis, by ‘deconstructing’ such programmes whilst simultaneously 
recognizing the classed devaluing that her partner and friends attempt to subject her to.  
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Unlike the respondents in Reay’s (1997) study of class mobility, in these moments Sian does 
not feel disconnected from her originary class or the class she is moving toward.  Rather, the 
practice of jouissance that Sian experiences enables a fusion between them.  
 
Call No Student Happy until She Has Achieved Singularity 
Colebrook (2007: 84) notes that ‘Human happiness, in contrast to mere animal pleasure, has 
- from Greek ethics onward - always referred to life as a whole. Such a life is a narrative life, 
where the end drives and orders each element, and where the time of the self is not a mere 
series of pleasures: not a time of mere 'nows' with no relation to each other or a grander 
whole. Narrative time is a time aware of itself, a time bounded by death, by the sense of an 
end or the limit of the self’.  As Colebrook notes ‘Call no man happy until he is dead’ (ibid).   
 
The narrative of an end point, in which previous experiences come to be re-evaluated as 
more positive and worthwhile, indicates the significance of an imagined end of an identity.  
In such imaginings, the devaluing of one identity and the valuing of another gives rise to 
anticipated pleasures. In so doing, future pleasure seduces through a glimpse of possible 
becomings.  It is, if you like, part of what keeps one going.  As Colebrook (2007: 84) notes, ‘It 
is the self I would become that allows the present to be more than itself. The present is 
rendered meaningful or happy only by the promise of the future, a future which can be 
anticipated only as the end of the self (where 'end' refers both to the ideal self and the 
termination of the self).’  I explore this here through the notion of originality so central to 
PhD study.  
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As we know, the concept of originality is exceptionally nebulous and yet it is the key value 
ascribed to the PhD.  A PhD student is required to have some mark of singularity, something 
that sets them apart in order to demonstrate how they have broken away from the mass of 
received knowledge. PhD students need, ultimately, to exhibit their intellectual 
independence.  Rose (2001: 13) suggests that there is nothing specifically bourgeois in the 
pursuit of intellectual independence, and indeed ‘if anything, it may have been strongest in 
people who have spent their lives following orders and wanted to change that’.  Rose charts 
the ways in which working-class people pursued their reading of literary canons through a 
form of self-directed learning at an individual level and also, more collectively, how, for 
example, religious understandings were challenged through various church groups.  Rose 
states how the mission statement of such autodidacts can be understood ‘to be more than 
passive consumers of literature, to be active thinkers and writers’ (p 57). In its concern to 
challenge received canons of knowledge intellectual independence is also a key site of, and 
for, class and feminist struggle. 
 
In her pursuit of intellectual independence, Sian views her research as a biographical 
project, an intellectual project and a political project.  In this respect, she hopes that her 
research will make a contribution, in a broader political and intellectual sense, to feminist 
and class change.  Intellectual independence, nonetheless, is not solely about potential 
impacts in this more public citizenship sense.  It is also about changes at deeper personal 
levels of identity and selfhood.  Sian’s education and experience have rendered her class 
identifications complex and contradictory, and one would add highly reflexive. One of the 
key aims of her continuing education as a research student is to strive for a form of identity 
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that remains authentic in the sense of not being other than that which she was, but is other 
in terms of whom she might become.  Intellectual independence, then, means being: 
 
At one with what you are doing, totally, it is like you are vindicated, all the doubts, 
and the rejected doubt as well, gone. 
 
In this regard recognition is a necessary condition of intellectual independence.  Having the 
title ‘Dr’, for example, evidences such recognition in the broadest sense and permits the 
recipient to practice their craft in relatively independent ways.  But there is something more 
than simply being recognized as worthy of the title ‘Dr’ in the interpellation of originality 
that is central to a PhD.  There is also the potential pleasure of singularity, of being unique 
and individual and, indeed, special.   Singularity does more than vindicate doubt, though not 
I would argue completely extinguish it.  It can mark one – or one’s work - out as superior.  
When discussing with Sian whether she indulged in any private fantasies or dreams about 
the future after the PhD, she commented that she sometimes imagines receiving the 
academic equivalent of an Oscar for her work.  This imaginative line of flight pushes her to 
the person she might become as a respected and fully fledged academic.  As such, this is not 
an issue of self-aggrandizement, but rather a very necessary resource of hope and 
possibility.   
 
Sian’s description of receiving an ‘Oscar’ adds a further important element of sociality to our 
understanding of how pleasure works as a force for change. Gatens (2000: 67) notes how 
sociality is a significant aspect of Spinoza’s thought and through which ‘each individual seeks 
out that which it imagines or thinks will increase its power of preserving itself.  From this 
22 | P a g e  
 
simple maxim, it follows that an attempt to organize one’s encounters in order to minimize 
bad and maximize good affects leads human beings to sociability.  He [Spinoza] argues that, 
of all the bodies we are most likely to encounter, it is those bodies which are like our own 
that will be most useful to us, most composable with our own, and most enhancing in our 
endeavour to maximize good affects’. Receiving an Oscar is a public event, unlike the 
relatively unusual privatized experience of a UK PhD viva.  It is public recognition on the 
grandest scale. Sian’s description of her dream is one where she is surrounded by bodies like 
her and where feminist concerns about connection are such that the Oscar is not just about 
recognition of self.  It is also recognition of the, often invisible, labour and support of others.  
Thus the public recognition of an Oscar is an extended and pleasurable sociality to peers, 
family and colleagues:      
 
Sometimes the acknowledgement pages make me cry especially the feminist ones 
that esteem their feminist colleagues. That side of it is like fantasizing about winning 
an Oscar … these are my best mates and they have nourished me and this is why they 
are so great and this is what an Oscar speech is like … I couldn’t do it without all 
these people.  
 
Just as Sian can allow herself the pleasure of an idealised fantasy, we can imagine how this 
forms part of a resource that can be called upon when continuing with a PhD becomes 
difficult in the face of the various material and emotional pressures that students 
experience and the learnt gendered and classed insecurities of those experiencing class 
travel.  We can also imagine how this pleasure is a necessary resource to enable Sian to live 
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with the difficulties of the now in order that life as a PhD student might become a grander 
whole in which the life lived and the sacrifices given, are deemed worthwhile.     
 
Conclusion 
One of the purposes of this article has been to explore pleasure through values within the 
doctoral process.  I have noted how displeasure appears to be the significant mode of 
understanding doctoral experiences.  Without in any sense downplaying the struggle many 
students experience, it may be worth pausing to consider how this configures PhD study in 
very specific ways and how the discursive construction of the PhD as a fundamentally 
negative experience has hedonophobic tendencies. In terms of value we might, first of all, 
ask why we don’t value pleasure in learning to become academic more.   
 
More specifically, I have enquired into the production of specific affects consequent upon 
encountering bodies that are representational of values that one is striving to emulate.   
These include the bodies of various texts, including the writings of esteemed academics and 
the awaiting-to-be-written PhD text, the bodies of the supervisor(s) and other academics 
and students.  The values I have discussed in this article in respect of doctoral pedagogy 
include the ability to express oneself and develop independent judgment.  I have also 
discussed the value given to originality and singularity.  The written PhD provides the 
evidential basis for attribution to a person of these qualities.   
 
In terms of the data presented in this article, the affects arising from encountering the 
academically located aspects of the PhD, such as the requirement to produce written text 
and to become published, illustrate how pleasure is attached to a range of other emotions 
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including guilt, unease and fear of pleasure’s potentially chimerical qualities.  This is not to 
say that there is no pleasure here at all.  Rather, that it can all too easily be lost in the 
weight of joyless anxiety associated with, although not wholly consequential upon, being 
the kind of not-quite-of-the-academy body that has to change.    
 
Yet pleasure is released from this tie to negative emotions in specific sites of experience and 
moments of jouissance, that include the practice of critical reasoning and the secret 
pleasure of achievement, both actual and possible.  Engaged critique of reality television 
programmes may appear a stretch too far away from doctoral processes per se.  It is 
certainly not an assessed element (in this case at least), and may indeed be part of Sian’s life 
that is not just invisible but also unimportant to doctoral supervision.  Although it lies 
outside the academy, this pleasure is not completely beyond its judgmental reach to be 
compromised.  As Sian’s university friends indicate, they hold her to account for her 
working-class ‘ways’.  However, Sian is able to resist the full impact of this to diminish her 
because this pleasure is fully orgasmic.  That is, it is all encompassing and life affirming as it 
brings together so completely the past and future.   
 
It is perhaps telling, however, that Sian keeps a secret of an academic’s positive response to 
her work, as this indicates the fragility of new identifications and becomings.  These kinds of 
undisclosed pleasures have a different quality to the pleasure-pain of writing and the 
orgasmic pleasure of jouissance.  By keeping them private, one exposes neither frailty nor 
hope in the way that the written text is an exposure of worth.  Secrets and dreams also 
protect one from the judgment of others.  These secret pleasures form a resource in a keep-
one-going kind of way.  This is more fully explicated in the hopes and dreams of winning an 
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Oscar.  What is significant here is the communal form of this pleasure.  For Sian, this is the 
public approbation of welcome recognition into an academy of scholars of equal merit and 
respect.    
 
A further aim of this articlehas been to consider how pleasure may be a force of change 
rather than stasis. Our common understandings of change are in terms of a before-and-after 
linear trajectory from one state to another.  Certainly, narrative discourses of progress and 
duality embedded in everyday talk point us in this direction.  However, here I have to work 
against the grain of Sian’s account through which the accomplishment of a PhD is an end 
point in the way that the end of a life is commonly conceived.  I also have to work against 
the grain of separating pleasure as stasis from desire as change.   
 
When we talk about linearity, what are we referring to?  Of course, there is a timeline in 
acquiring (or not) a PhD.  One either has a PhD or one does not.  This kind of division 
presents one kind of marker but, I would argue, only in terms of accreditation, certification 
and perhaps employability.  In terms of subjectivity, can one really say that the award of a 
certificate marks an end of one identificatory position and the beginning of another?  Might 
not the cynical, or the experienced, argue that whilst Sian might believe her sense of a lack 
of entitlement to be a knower would diminish once she has been awarded her doctorate, 
this is not necessarily the case as such feelings are not so easily deterritorialized?  Further, in 
many instances, certain kinds of pleasure in this article appear as a false dawn.  They are 
experienced as undeserving or presage a fall.  In this sense they are hardly pleasurable at all.  
This does not mean, however, that we should discount their affect.   
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In terms of this article, this requires us to enquire into the force that particular forms of 
pleasure have in these processes.  MacCormack (2008) notes that ‘the body after pleasure … 
is not returned, happy or satisfied but disrupted, irreversibly changed and affected’.   Here, 
it is worth focusing a little more on Deleuze’s concept of a line of flight, as this provides a 
way of analysing flux and flow. Fleming (2002: 202) notes that ‘Resistance for Deleuze and 
Guattari is captured by the pithy phrase “line of flight” … and is intended to represent the 
tangential catapulting that flings us out of the spiral of domination, which a sedimentation 
of strata has legislated as centre’.  In terms of change, this would point us to understanding 
a line of flight as a partial undoing (Fleming, 2002).  Thus, it may be that some forms of 
pleasure are no more than redemptive moments in an otherwise bleak landscape.  The data 
in this article exhibits a strong sense that, when experienced, certain kinds of pleasure are 
to be treated with caution.  They can offer false hope and can be experienced as 
undeserving.  They can be a momentary escape with a consequent return to stasis. 
However, pleasure also provides a fragile line of flight away from the negative classed and 
gendered meanings of being an inappropriate subject in the academy.   
 
In this regard, it appears to me important to note that the complexities of such movements 
are such that the class traveler does not wish merely to learn how to pass or, in most cases, 
reject their past completely.  This would be something of a reterritorializing move of 
overcoding or an instantiation of ideology.  Rather, successful transition requires a sense of 
authenticity to be retained, through which the past and present become forged into 
something as yet unknown.  Here, becoming is ‘not a linear activity whereby one simply 
turns into an identifiable something else’ (MacCormack, 2008).  Rather it is ‘a suggestion for 
entertaining new ways’ (ibid).  
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Certainly we can argue that moments of pleasure, certainly complicatedly mingled with a 
host of other emotions, remain in the body-mind.  As Renold and Ringrose (2008: 321) note, 
whilst ‘movements and ruptures and lines of flight are not grand or total escapes but often 
subject to recuperation … resonances of the movements remain’.   And other forms of 
pleasure, in this case the Noachian force of jouissance, so central to Irigaray-inspired 
feminist politics, and the anticipatory pleasures of Oscar moments do leave a more 
profound mark to counter the fraughtness associated with being inadequate and incapable 
in intellectual work.  In such instances, rather than focusing on melancholia and loss, let us 
consider the ‘over-flowing plenitude of pleasure’ (Braidotti, 2002: 53) as constituting a 
challenge to the negativity and lack associated with desire and the gloomy view we portray 
of undertaking a PhD.  After all, there are great pleasures in subversion.    
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